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On the Waxing and Waning of Working Memory: 
Action Orientation Moderates the Impact of 
Demanding Relationship Primes on Working 
Memory CapacityNils B. Jostmann
Sander L. Koole
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdamother misfortunes, people need to rely on their working
memory capacity (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999).
Working memory capacity is an immensely useful psy-
chological resource that allows people to remember
important information even when they are temporarily
distracted. Past research and theorizing make inconsistent
predictions regarding the effects of situational demands
on working memory capacity. On one hand, people may
utilize their working memory capacity less efficiently
under high demands (e.g., Baumeister, 1984). On the
other hand, high demands may lead people to mobilize
greater control resources and thereby utilizing their work-
ing memory capacity more efficiently (e.g., Botvinick,
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). In the present
research, we suggest a possible way to reconcile these The present research examined how action- versus state-
oriented individuals (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994) utilize their
working memory capacity under varying situational demands.
Participants visualized either a demanding or an accepting
person, after which their working memory capacity was assessed.
Among action-oriented participants, visualizing a demanding
person led to greater operation spans (Study 1) and superior
memory for intention-related information (Study 2) than visualiz-
ing an accepting person. State-oriented participants displayed the
opposite pattern, such that visualizing an accepting person led to
greater operation spans (Study 1) and superior memory for inten-
tions (Study 2) than visualizing a demanding person. These find-
ings indicate that action versus state orientation moderates the
impact of situational demands on working memory capacity.conflicting notions. Based on personality systems interactions
(PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), we propose that the
effects of situational demands on working memory
capacity are moderated by action versus state orientation.Keywords: working memory capacity; action orientation; state ori-
entation; relationship schemas17
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The ability to remember the right things at the right
time is often critical for achieving one’s goals. For
instance, remembering the departure time of one’s train,
the name of the restaurant where one is supposed to meet
a business associate, or that one should buy a birthday
present for one’s partner all help to avoid decidedly
unpleasant experiences. Unfortunately, various circum-
stances, such as unexpected phone calls, heavy workloads,
or pressing social commitments, often make it neces-
sary to consider many things simultaneously (Shah,
Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2003), leaving train schedules,
restaurant names, and birthday presents candidates for
unwitting neglect (Reason & Mycielska, 1982). To prevent
long delays, lost business, disappointed partners, and
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Action-oriented individuals utilize their working memory
capacity more efficiently in high-demanding situations,
whereas state-oriented individuals utilize their working
memory capacity less efficiently in high-demanding situa-
tions. In the following paragraphs, we begin by reviewing
the literatures on working memory capacity and action
versus state orientation. We then present two experiments
that tested our theoretical analysis.
How Working Memory Works
Working memory protects stored information against
premature loss due to strong distracters (Baddeley, 1986;
Engle et al., 1999; cf. Miyake & Shah, 1999). This vital task
involves both short-term storage and attentional
processes. Stored information in working memory is
unlikely to be consciously represented at all times.
Instead, such information persists in a state of heightened
activation that makes it explicitly available to conscious
awareness. Due to capacity constraints, working memory
can only process a limited amount of explicit information
simultaneously.
Working memory capacity is especially important
when people have to remember what to do. Oftentimes,
people have to postpone their intentions because they
cannot enact them immediately (Kvavilashvili, 1987). To
the extent that the intended action is novel, difficult, or
can be easily forgotten, the intention needs to remain
represented in an explicit format until the situation is
appropriate for enactment. Given that working memory
supports such explicit formats (Baddeley, 1986), working
memory is intimately involved in the maintenance of
explicit intentions in memory (Kane & Engle, 2003).
The latter function is known as intention memory (Kuhl,
2000). There are some subtle differences between inten-
tion memory and working memory (for a discussion, see
Kazén & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999). Nevertheless,
intention memory and working memory both rely on the
same limited mental resources and are supported by
partly overlapping brain structures (e.g., left prefrontal
cortex; cf. Fuster, 1995). In recognition of the important
functional parallels between the two memory systems, we
emphasize the similarities between working memory and
intention memory in the present context.
One of the most popular measures of working
memory capacity is the Operation Span (OSPAN) task
(Turner & Engle, 1989). In the OSPAN task, partici-
pants are required to calculate simple arithmetic equa-
tions while retaining short series of words in memory
for later recall. Working memory capacity is reflected by
a person’s span, that is, the number of words that can
be recalled correctly while performing the calculations.
Using various kinds of span tasks, research has shown
that there exist substantial individual differences in
working memory capacity. Relative to individuals with
small memory spans, individuals with large memory spans
display greater resistance to distraction, higher general
fluid intelligence, and better academic achievement (for
a review, see Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004).
The Dual Role of Demand
Depending on situational factors, people may not
always be able to utilize their working memory capacity
efficiently (cf. Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Based on previ-
ous research and theorizing (Braver & Cohen, 2000;
Kuhl, 2000; Van der Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2003),
we suggest that people may utilize their working memory
capacity less efficiently under conditions of sustained
working memory load. Sustained working memory load
may impair the updating function of working memory
such that situation-irrelevant information cannot be
erased and new tasks cannot be properly processed. In
the present context, we refer to conditions of sustained
working memory load as high demanding. By contrast, 
we term conditions without such load as low demanding.
High demands may leave less working memory capac-
ity available in a variety of everyday life situations or exper-
imental settings such as during the activation of difficult
intentions (Kuhl & Helle, 1986), or multiple incompatible
goals (Shah et al., 2003), in the presence of demanding
relationships (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990), or after
prolonged engagement in tasks that require continuous
working memory activation (Lorist, Boksem, &
Ridderinkhof, 2005). In line with this idea, previous
research has found that people utilize their working
memory capacity less efficiently as a result of stressful life
events (Klein & Boals, 2001), mental fatigue (Van der
Linden et al., 2003), ego depletion (Schmeichel, Vohs, &
Baumeister, 2003), or when people try to overcome strong
impulses (Zwaan & Truitt, 1998). Evidence thus suggests
that working memory is prone to “choking under pres-
sure” (Baumeister, 1984).
The notion that people better utilize their working
memory capacity under low rather than high demands is
intuitively plausible. However, high demands may not
always have a negative impact on working memory capac-
ity. When people encounter high-demanding conditions,
this may signal to people that their current amount of
working memory capacity is not sufficient. In response,
people may channel more resources to their working
memory, thereby utilizing their working memory capac-
ity more efficiently under high demands. This idea is
consistent with recent notions of top-down control
processes. Contemporary theories of action control
(Gollwitzer, 1996; Kuhl, 1984; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk,
2004) assume that people more intensively shield their
intentions against unwitting loss when they experience
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or anticipate difficulties to enact their intentions.
Furthermore, neuropsychological research indicates that
the detection of conflict in information processing can
lead to compensatory strengthening of cognitive control
in Stroop-like interference tasks (Botvinick et al., 2001).
Thus, to the extent that working memory capacity is
implicated in action control and cognitive control,
people may better utilize their working memory capacity
under high demands.
Regulation of Working Memory: The Case of Action 
Versus State Orientation
It appears that high demands can either undermine or
facilitate working memory. As such, there likely exist
moderating variables that determine the direction of the
impact of situational demands on working memory
capacity. One such moderator may be the person’s dispo-
sition toward action versus state orientation (Kuhl, 1984,
1994, 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). Action orientation
is conceived as a metastatic (change promoting) regula-
tory mode that is characterized by decisiveness and initia-
tive. Action orientation thus facilitates intentional action.
By contrast, state orientation is conceived as a cata-static
(change preventing) regulatory mode that is character-
ized by indecisiveness and hesitation. State orientation
thus leads to the perseverance of current behavioral and
mental states. In other words, action versus state orienta-
tion reflects the person’s ability to induce the behavioral
and mental changes to terminate the status quo (Kuhl,
1984). According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 1994, 2000), action
versus state orientation varies chronically between indi-
viduals, such that some individuals are more action-
oriented, whereas others are more state-oriented.
Action versus state orientation is distinct from classic
motivational constructs (Kuhl, 1984). More specifically,
classic motivational constructs refer to people’s prefer-
ences to select a particular class of motivational tenden-
cies. For instance, people may choose to pursue mastery
goals or performance goals (Elliot & McGregor, 2001),
adopt a promotion focus or a prevention focus (Higgins,
1998), or be driven by implicit or explicit needs
(McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). By con-
trast, action versus state orientation refers to the effi-
ciency with which people can instigate the behavioral
and mental changes necessary to enact a particular moti-
vational tendency. Consequently, action orientation can
increase the enactment of any motivational tendencies
that involve making difficult behavioral and mental
changes. Consistent with this reasoning, action- compared
to state-oriented individuals are more efficient on both
mastery and performance goals (Diefendorff, 2004),
report having more success in both promotion and pre-
vention goals (Koole, 2005),1 and are more successful at
reconciling their implicit and explicit needs (Baumann,
Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005). In short, both theoretical and
empirical considerations indicate that the impact of
action versus state orientation occurs over and above
classic motivation constructs.
Particularly relevant in the present context, action- 
versus state-oriented individuals have been found to
respond very differently to situational demands. When
confronted with increased demands, action-oriented indi-
viduals tend to mobilize their self-regulatory resources.
For instance, relative to their state-oriented counterparts,
action-oriented college students are better able to orga-
nize the multiple demands of college life (Diefendorff et
al., 1998). In addition, action-oriented individuals better
regulate their affective states under high demands (Koole
& Jostmann, 2004; cf. Jostmann, Koole, Van der Wulp, &
Fockenberg, 2005). Finally, action-oriented individuals
maintain or even increase their task performance under
demanding conditions (Heckhausen & Strang, 1988). By
contrast, state-oriented individuals tend to choke under
increasing demands (Heckhausen & Strang, 1988).
Notably, state-oriented individuals do not necessarily dis-
play performance deficits under low-demanding condi-
tions. Indeed, state-oriented individuals may outperform
action-oriented individuals under supportive conditions,
presumably because state-oriented individuals are more
receptive to external motivational support (Koole, Kuhl,
Jostmann, & Vohs, 2005).
Given that action versus state orientation generally
moderates how people are coping with demands, it
stands to reason that action versus state orientation also
may moderate the impact of demands on working
memory capacity. Specifically, the indecisiveness and hes-
itation that are characteristic of state-oriented individuals
may translate into a tendency to maintain stored infor-
mation in working memory even when quick decisions
and initiative are more desirable (Stiensmeier-Pelster,
1994). State-oriented individuals indeed have been
found to display a general tendency to engage their
working memory capacity (cf. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
Whenever an additional working memory load is exter-
nally induced under high demands (e.g., through stress-
ful life events), state-oriented individuals are likely to
remain under such load, thereby decreasing the working
memory capacity that is available for subsequent tasks
(Jostmann & Koole, 2006). Consequently, state-oriented
individuals may utilize their working memory capacity
less efficiently under high demands.
By contrast, action-oriented individuals are likely to
use their working memory capacity more efficiently with
increasing demands. This mobilization pattern is likely
due to the decisiveness and initiative that characterize
action-oriented individuals (Kuhl, 1984), which should
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help these individuals to reduce the duration and severity
of working memory load. Accordingly, when working
memory load is induced under high demands, action-
oriented individuals are likely to terminate this load as
soon as task requirements permit. High demands may
thus activate action-oriented individuals’ tendency to
update their working memory, thereby making more
working memory capacity available for subsequent tasks
(Jostmann & Koole, 2006; Stiensmeier-Pelster, 1994). By
regularly updating the contents of their working memory,
action-oriented individuals are likely to better utilize their
working memory capacity under high demands.
It is important to note that the preceding functional
differences between action- and state-oriented individ-
uals only apply to high-demanding conditions. Low-
demanding conditions put less strain on working
memory so that the functional advantage of action-
oriented individuals will diminish with lower levels of
demand. In fact, some low-demanding contexts may
even provide state-oriented individuals with a func-
tional advantage. Such benefits of state orientation are
especially likely to occur when the situational context is
rewarding. The experience or anticipation of rewards is
conducive to the updating of information in working
memory (cf. Braver & Cohen, 2000; Dreisbach &
Goschke, 2004). State-oriented individuals are more
receptive than action-oriented individuals to externally
provided incentives (cf. Koole et al., 2005). A rewarding
context may therefore allow especially state-oriented
individuals to free up their working memory capacity.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
The present research sought to provide the first sys-
tematic empirical test of the idea that action versus state
orientation moderates the impact of situational demands
on working memory capacity. To induce high or low lev-
els of situational demands, we primed a demanding or
accepting relationship schema (Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996;
Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Previous research found that
priming mental representations of relationships with a
significant other activates a host of goals, expectations,
and self-evaluations that characterize the interaction
with that person (Baldwin et al., 1990; Fitzsimons &
Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003; cf. Chen, Boucher, & Tapias,
2006). Building upon these findings, we reasoned that
the activation of relationship schemas also would have
consequences for working memory capacity. Specifically,
priming one’s relationship with a demanding other likely
puts a high strain on working memory, thereby exhaust-
ing its capacity. By contrast, priming the relationship
with an accepting other likely puts a low strain on work-
ing memory. Indeed, to the extent that accepting others
provide a rewarding psychological context in which one
feels accepted unconditionally, priming an accepting
relationship may even help individuals to free up work-
ing memory capacity (cf. Koole et al., 2005; Koole, Kuhl,
Jostmann, & Finkenauer, 2006). In sum, visualizing a
demanding person may induce a psychological context
of high demand, whereas visualizing an accepting person
may induce a psychological context of low demand.
Following the demand manipulation, we adminis-
tered a set of validated measures of working memory
capacity. In Study 1, we measured working memory
capacity by means of an OSPAN task (Turner & Engle,
1989). In Study 2, we measured working memory capac-
ity by means of an intention memory task (Goschke &
Kuhl, 1993). Given that working memory capacity is
functionally linked with intention memory (Kazén &
Kuhl, 2005), we expected parallel effects on the inten-
tion memory task and the OSPAN task. Specifically, we
predicted that action-oriented individuals would better
utilize their working memory capacity under high
demands such that visualizing a demanding relation-
ship leads to higher span scores (Study 1) and better
intention memory (Study 2) than visualizing an accept-
ing relationship. By contrast, we predicted that state-
oriented individuals’ working memory would choke
under high demands such that visualizing a demanding
relationship leads to lower span scores and worse inten-




Seventy-four paid volunteers at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam (28 men, 46 women, average age = 20) par-
ticipated in the experiment. The experimental design was
2 (orientation: action vs. state) × 2 (visualization: demand-
ing vs. accepting) between participants. Participants were
randomly assigned to the demanding (n = 35) or the
accepting (n = 39) condition. The main dependent vari-
able consisted of the number of correctly remembered
words during the OSPAN task.
PROCEDURE
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were led
into individual cubicles, each containing a computer.
Experimental instructions were administered via a com-
puter program. Participants were first informed that they
would participate in several unrelated studies that were
allegedly administered together for efficiency reasons.
Participants then moved on with the first study, which
was introduced as a study on personality and contained
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our assessment of individual differences in action versus
state orientation. Next, participants continued with a
visualization task during which either high or low levels
of demand were induced. Subsequently, participants per-
formed the OSPAN task. After this, participants answered a
manipulation check and provided some biographical
information. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked,
and paid by the experimenter.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Individual differences. To assess individual differences
in action versus state orientation, we used a Dutch
translation of the Action Control Scale (ACS-90; Kuhl,
1994). In both studies, we administered the demand-
related (AOD) and the threat-related (AOT) subscale
of the ASC-90.2 According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2001, p.
243; cf. Baumann et al., 2005; Koole & Jostmann, 2004),
demand and threat represent different aversive states
each related to different trigger conditions and differ-
ent symptoms. AOD measures whether a person is deci-
sive and active (action-oriented) or indecisive and
inertial (state-oriented) under high demands. By con-
trast, AOT measures whether a person becomes chal-
lenged (action-oriented) or remains threatened
(state-oriented) in situations that are perceived as dan-
gerous to one’s well-being or self-image (cf. Blascovich
& Mendes, 2000). We found no effects of AOT in the
present investigation, which indicates that our manipu-
lation did not trigger challenge and threat processes,
all Fs < 1. We therefore report only effects of AOD. For
the sake of convenience, we use the more general term
“action versus state orientation” throughout this article
to refer to AOD unless a more precise distinction is
required.
The AOD subscale consists of 12 items, which were
intermingled and presented in a different random order
for each participant. Each item describes a demanding
situation and an action-oriented versus state-oriented way
of coping with that situation. For each item, participants
are asked to select the response that best described their
own reaction in that situation. An example item is as fol-
lows: “When I have a lot of important things to do and
they must all be done soon: (a) I often don’t know where
to begin or (b) I find it easy to make a plan and stick with
it.” In this example, option (a) reflects the state-oriented
response and option (b) reflects the action-oriented
response. Action-oriented responses were coded as 1 and
state-oriented responses were coded as 0 and summed for
the entire subscale. Reliability for the AOD scale was suf-
ficient (Kuder-Richardson, KR, 20 coefficient = .78).
Scores could range from 0 to 12. Participants who gave
seven or more action-oriented responses were assigned to
the action-oriented group (n = 42); participants who gave
six or fewer action-oriented responses were assigned to
the state-oriented group (n = 37).3
Visualization manipulation. The visualization procedure
was modeled after Baldwin and Sinclair (1996). During
the procedure, which was introduced as a visualization
exercise, participants were asked to visualize a particular
person from their own life. In the demanding condition,
participants were requested to think of a person who was
highly demanding of them. Participants had to type in
the initials of this person, which were used throughout
the exercise in referring to the visualization target.
Participants were instructed to vividly imagine being with
this person and to reexperience their thoughts and feel-
ings associated with this person. At various stages during
the visualization, participants typed in the experiences
that were evoked by the visualization. At the end of the
exercise, participants were asked to rate their ease of visu-
alization. In the accepting visualization condition, partic-
ipants went through the same procedure but instead
visualized a person who was highly accepting of them.
DEPENDENT MEASURE
Working memory task. To measure working memory
capacity we used a computerized version of the OSPAN
task adapted from Schmader and Johns (2003; cf.
Turner & Engle, 1989). The OSPAN task interleaves
short series of words to memorize with simple mathe-
matical equations to be evaluated. In the present inves-
tigation, each equation began with the multiplication
or division of two positive integers (e.g., 5 × 7). The
product of this operation then had to be added to, or
subtracted from, another positive integer. For each
equation, the answer was included in the expression.
The task of the participants was to evaluate by means of
a key-press whether the equation was correct or incor-
rect, for example, “Is (5 × 7) – 12 = 23?” When the equa-
tion was correct, participants had to press the “A”
button on the left side of the keyboard, whereas they
had to press the “6” button on the numeric pad on the
right side of the keyboard when the equation was incor-
rect. After each equation, a word to memorize was pre-
sented. After a series of equation word pairs (i.e., a set),
participants were requested to type in all words they
recalled from the preceding set. After this, a new set of
equation word pairs started.
Sets differed in length varying from three to five
equation word pairs per set. Six sets of each length were
presented, allowing scores to range from 0 to 72.
Presentation order of the sets was randomized for each
participant, such that the number of words to recall was
unknown until recall. The generation of mathematical
equations followed the criteria of Schmader and Johns
(2003). Half of the equations were correct, and the
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remaining equations were incorrect. The 72 words used
in the test were monosyllabic Dutch nouns that were
randomly assigned to sets. Within sets, equation word
pairs were presented in a different random order for
each participant. The assignment of equations and
words to sets was identical for all participants.
Each trial within a set began with the appearance of
a fixation asterisk on the screen for 1 s followed by an
equation, which remained visible until participants had
pressed a response key. After this, the screen remained
blank for 500 ms, followed by the appearance of a word
to be recalled. After 2 s, the screen went blank again for
1 s, followed by the next trial. Sets were separated by the
announcement “next set,” which remained visible for 3 s.
The computer unobtrusively recorded the words recalled,
participants’ responses on the equations, and the time
spent on each equation.
Results
Manipulation check. At the end of the experimental
session, participants were asked to rate on two items
how demanding and how accepting the person was
whom they had visualized (1 = not at all, 9 = very much).
These items were scored in the same direction and
averaged (Cronbach’s α = .88). The visualized person
was rated as more demanding in the demanding condi-
tion than in the accepting condition, F(1, 70) = 74.08,
p < .001, ηp2 = .51 (M = 5.61 vs. M = 2.68). No effects of
action versus state orientation were found on this
index, all Fs < 1.
OSPAN performance. Span scores were assessed by
counting the total number of correctly recalled words.
(Redoing the analyses with the number of correctly
recalled words only from sets where all the words in the
set were recalled correctly yielded equivalent results; cf.
Schmader & Johns, 2003.) We subjected average span
scores to a 2 (orientation: action vs. state) × 2 (visual-
ization: demanding vs. accepting) ANOVA, which
yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 70) = 11.17, p <
.002, ηp2 = .14. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.
Simple effects analyses revealed that action-oriented
participants displayed marginally higher span scores in
the demanding condition than in the accepting condi-
tion, F(1, 70) = 5.89, p < .06, ηp2 = .08 (M = 69.00 vs. 
M = 66.21). By contrast, state-oriented participants had
significantly lower span scores in the demanding con-
dition than in the accepting condition, F(1, 70) = 5.31,
p < .03, ηp2 = .07 (M = 66.05 vs. M = 68.80). Another way
to interpret the data is to note that in the demanding
condition, action-oriented participants had higher span
scores than did state-oriented participants, F(1, 70) =
6.11, p < .02, ηp2 = .08 (M = 69.00 vs. M = 66.05). In the
accepting condition, however, the pattern was reversed,
such that action-oriented participants had lower span
scores than did state-oriented participants, F(1, 70) =
5.07, p < .03, ηp2 = .07 (M = 66.21 vs. M = 68.80).
Supplementary analyses. Additional analyses revealed
that the results remained identical when we controlled
for the number of correctly evaluated equations (Grand
M = 88%). Moreover, we found no effects of orientation
or visualization on the number of correctly evaluated
equations, all Fs < 1.
Discussion
As predicted, the effects of situational demands on
working memory capacity were moderated by action ver-
sus state orientation. Among action-oriented partici-
pants, priming a demanding relationship context made
them utilize their working memory capacity more effi-
ciently than priming an accepting relationship context,
as indicated by participants’ OSPAN scores. Action-
oriented individuals thus utilized their working memory
capacity especially under demanding conditions. By con-
trast, state-oriented participants displayed higher span
scores after priming an accepting compared to a
demanding relationship. State-oriented individuals thus
utilized their working memory capacity especially under
low-demanding conditions. Stated differently, priming a
demanding relationship led to better utilization of work-
ing memory capacity among action- compared to state-
oriented participants, whereas the reverse was true after
priming an accepting relationship.
STUDY 2
Study 2 examined the effects of situational demands
and action versus state orientation on intention
memory. As discussed before, working memory capacity
is required for the preparation of intentional action.
Accordingly, a person’s working memory capacity may
be reflected in her or his ability to maintain explicit
representations of intentions (Kane & Engle, 2003).
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TABLE 1: Operation Spans (OSPAN) as a Function of
Visualization and Orientation (Study 1)
Visualization
Orientation Accepting Demanding
Action 66.21 (4.21)a 69.00 (1.65)b
State 68.80 (1.82)c 66.05 (4.37)d
NOTE: Scores could range from 0 (low OSPAN) to 72 (high OSPAN).
Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
a. n = 24.
b. n = 15.
c. n = 15.
d. n = 20.
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The intention memory task in Study 2 differed in sev-
eral meaningful ways from the OSPAN task in Study 1.
The OSPAN task represents a dual-task situation, in which
participants have to memorize information while they 
are simultaneously processing unrelated information.
Neither type of information is relevant for the prepara-
tion of action. By contrast, the intention memory task did
not involve dual-task conditions and the information
processed in the task was relevant for action preparation.
Consequently, extending our empirical analysis to inten-
tion memory provided additional insights into how
people utilize their working memory capacity for the pur-
pose of future action.
To assess intention memory, we used the postponed
intention task (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In this task, partic-
ipants have to learn a pair of short scripts describing activ-
ities (e.g., “clear a desk”) that entail several intermediate
steps (e.g., “sharpen the pencils”). After participants have
learned both scripts, they are informed that they have to
execute one of the scripts later (prospective script). The
other script (neutral script) does not have to be executed
by the participants. During a subsequent recognition task,
participants then have to decide whether words pre-
sented on the computer screen had appeared in one of
the two scripts. Using this paradigm, past research has
found evidence for an intention superiority effect, that is,
faster recognition latencies for words from the prospec-
tive script compared to words from the neutral script
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
Based on the theoretical link between working memory
capacity and intention memory (cf. Kazén & Kuhl,
2005), we predicted that action versus state orientation
would moderate the impact of demands on intention
memory performance in Study 2 much like it did on
OSPAN performance in Study 1. Specifically, we pre-
dicted that action-oriented participants would display a
greater intention superiority effect under high-demanding
conditions than under low-demanding conditions. By
contrast, we predicted that state-oriented participants
would display a greater intention superiority effect under
low-demanding than under high-demanding conditions.
Method
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
One hundred and twenty-six paid volunteers at 
the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (44 men, 82 women,
average age = 21) participated in the experiment. The
experimental design was 2 (orientation: action vs. state;
between participants) × 2 (visualization: demanding vs.
accepting; between participants). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the demanding (n = 62) or the accept-
ing (n = 64) visualization conditions. The main dependent
variable consisted of participants’ mean recognition times
and number of correctly remembered words from the
prospective and the neutral script. Seven participants
(5.5% of the entire sample) failed to recognize any words
from the neutral script. Because all participants recog-
nized at least some words of the prospective script, these
7 participants had probably misunderstood the task
instructions that they should respond to words of both
scripts. Because it was not possible to measure intention
superiority effects in recognition times for these partic-
ipants, they were removed from the dataset. One addi-
tional participant (.8% of the entire sample) was
excluded because he incorrectly indicated that the neu-
tral script had to be executed.
PROCEDURE
The equipment and general procedure were similar
to Study 1. Participants first answered a few question-
naires including the AOD subscale of the ASC-90 (Kuhl,
1994) to assess individual differences in action orienta-
tion (KR 20 = .73). Based on their responses, 69 partici-
pants were assigned to the state-oriented group, whereas
57 participants were assigned to the action-oriented
group. Next, participants continued with a practice trial
of the postponed intention task. The scripts used in the
practice postponed intention task were different from
those used during the actual postponed intention task.
After the practice trial, participants performed the visu-
alization task. Subsequently, participants went on with
the actual postponed intention task during which
responses where recorded for analysis. Next, participants
performed some unrelated tasks followed by a manipu-
lation check. Finally, participants were debriefed,
thanked, and paid for their participation.
DEPENDENT MEASURE
Postponed intention task. The postponed intention task
was adapted from Goschke and Kuhl (1993) and con-
sisted of a learning phase, a distracter task, the presenta-
tion of the execution instruction, and a recognition test.
The postponed intention task was described to the par-
ticipants as a study on people’s memory for simple activ-
ities. Participants were informed that they would receive
descriptions of two simple activities on the computer
screen. Participants expected that they had to learn these
descriptions, which were referred to as “scripts,” and that
their memory for both scripts would be tested in a recog-
nition test. Furthermore, it was stressed that participants
would have to execute one of the two scripts later during
the experiment. Which of the two scripts would be exe-
cuted was randomly determined by the computer.
The scripts consisted each of a script header (e.g.,
“setting a table”) and four propositions describing com-
ponent activities (e.g., “distribute the plates”). The learn-
ing phase started with the script header of the first script
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appearing on the screen followed by separate presenta-
tions of each of the four component activities. The
header and the components of the script were each dis-
played for 6 s. Subsequently, the entire script was dis-
played for another 30 s. After this, the second script 
was presented in an identical way. Subsequently, the
entire procedure was repeated such that both scripts were
presented two times to the participants. Next, partici-
pants proceeded with a short distracter task during which
they had to count backward in steps of three from a three-
digit number for 45 s. Subsequently, participants received
the instruction for which of the two scripts they had to
execute. The instruction consisted of the word “execute”
followed by one of the script headers (the prospective
script). In a second row, the words “do not execute” were
displayed followed by the second script header (the neu-
tral script). This execution instruction was displayed for
6 s. Assignment of the two scripts was counterbalanced
between participants such that each script served equally
often as the prospective script and the neutral script,
respectively.
Immediately after the presentation of the execution
instruction, participants received a recognition test,
during which single words were presented on the
screen. Participants were required to indicate for each
word whether they had seen that word in one of the two
scripts. If the word was identified as a word from one of
the two scripts, participants were to press the “A” key on
the left side of the keyboard. When the word was iden-
tified as a new word, participants were to press the “6”
key on the numeric pad on the right side of the key-
board. Participants were further told to respond quickly
and accurately and to guess whenever they were not
sure about the correct response.
The recognition test started with four warm-up trials.
After this, 44 words were presented sequentially to the
participants. Half of the words were derived from one of
the two scripts; the remaining words were new. Half of
the new words were semantically related to respectively
one of the scripts; the remaining new words were seman-
tically unrelated to either script. Each word remained on
the screen until participants gave a response. The screen
then remained blank for 1.5 s. The computer unobtru-
sively recorded participants’ responses and response
latencies. After the recognition test, participants had to
indicate which script had to be executed. Actual execu-
tion of the prospective script was only required during
the practice postponed intention task.
Results
Manipulation checks. At the end of the experimental
session, participants were asked to rate how demand-
ing and how accepting the person was whom they had
visualized (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). These two items
were scored such that higher scores indicated higher
perceived demandingness of the visualized person
(Cronbach’s α = .54). Given the low reliability coefficient,
we conducted a 2 (orientation) × 2 (visualization) multi-
variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on participants’
responses on the two items, which revealed a main effect
of visualization, F(1, 117) = 64.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. 
On average, the person who was visualized in the
demanding condition was perceived as more demanding
than the person who was visualized in the accepting con-
dition (M = 5.59 vs. M = 3.40). (We report averaged
scores to facilitate interpretation.) The analysis also
yielded a main effect of orientation, F(1, 117) = 6.62, 
p < .02, ηp2 = .05. State-oriented participants rated the visu-
alized person as more demanding than action-oriented
participants (M = 4.74 vs. M = 4.14). The interaction
between orientation and visualization was not significant,
F(1, 117) = 1.76, p = .19, ηp2 = .02.
Recognition times. Following Goschke and Kuhl
(1993), we first eliminated errors (i.e., the number of
script words that were not recognized, 16.2% of all
responses) and responses lower than 300 ms (1.6% of
all responses). Analyses on recognition latencies were
conducted on log-transformed data to normalize the
distribution (Ratcliff, 1993). To facilitate interpreta-
tion, we report untransformed means in ms.
We proceeded by subtracting average recognition
latencies for words from the prospective script from aver-
age recognition latencies for words from the neutral
script. The resulting difference scores index the inten-
tion superiority effect, that is, better memory for
prospective script words compared to neutral script
words. A 2 (orientation: action vs. state) × 2 (visualiza-
tion: demanding vs. accepting) ANOVA confirmed the
predicted two-way interaction effect between orientation
and visualization, F(1, 114) = 10.59, p < .002, ηp2 = .09.
Relevant means are displayed in Table 2. Action-oriented
participants displayed a larger intention superiority
effect in the demanding condition than in the accepting
condition, F(1, 114) = 6.20, p < .02, ηp2 = .06 (M = 121 vs.
M = –71). Simple t tests revealed a significant intention
superiority effect among action-oriented participants in
the demanding conditions, t(26) = 2.86, p < .009, but not
in the accepting condition, t < 1. By contrast, state-
oriented participants had a smaller intention superiority
effect in the demanding condition than in the accepting
condition, F(1, 114) = 4.40, p < .04, ηp2 = .04 (M = –47 vs.
M = 105). Simple t tests revealed a significant intention
superiority effect among state-oriented participants in
the accepting condition, t(33) = 2.53, p < .02, but not in
the demanding condition, t < 1.
Another way of interpreting the Orientation × Visu-
alization interaction is to note that in the demanding
condition, action-oriented participants showed a larger
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intention superiority effect than did state-oriented
participants, F(1, 114) = 4.05, p < .05, ηp2 = .03 (M = 121
vs. M = –47). In the accepting condition, we found a
significant reversal of the pattern. Specifically, action-
oriented participants displayed a lower intention supe-
riority effect than did state-oriented participants,
F(1, 114) = 6.72,  p < .02, ηp2 = .06 (M = –71 vs. M = 105).
Supplementary analyses on recognition times. Additional
analyses revealed that the effects on recognition laten-
cies remained intact when we statistically controlled for
error rates. Furthermore, the examination of intention
memory effects during the practice task revealed that
action-oriented (M = 83) and state-oriented participants
(M = 84) had similar intention memory effects under
such neutral conditions, F < 1. When we included inten-
tion memory during the practice task as a covariate, the
Orientation × Visualization interaction on intention
memory during the actual task remained significant.
Recognition accuracy. Following Goschke and Kuhl
(1993), we computed from the hit rates and false-alarm
rates a discriminability index A′ that was proposed by
Pollack (1970) as a nonparametric equivalent to d ′ and
that can be calculated even when the number of obser-
vations is small. Chance performance is reflected by an
A′ value of .5, whereas perfect performance yields an A′
of 1.0. For each participant, we calculated A′ separately
for neutral and prospective words.4 Discriminability
indices A′ were subjected to a 2 (orientation) × 2 (visual-
ization) × 2 (script type: prospective vs. neutral) ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis
yielded only a significant main effect for script type, 
F(1, 114) = 11.20, p < .002. Specifically, A′ values for
prospective words were higher (A′ = .81) than A′ values
for neutral words (A′ = .78). The analysis revealed no
effects of orientation or visualization, all Fs < 1.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 confirmed that action versus
state orientation moderates the impact of situational
demands on intention memory. Action-oriented partic-
ipants displayed a significant intention superiority effect
after priming a demanding relationship but not after
priming an accepting relationship. Among state-ori-
ented participants, however, this pattern was reversed
such that state-oriented participants displayed a signifi-
cant intention superiority effect after priming an accept-
ing relationship but not after priming a demanding
relationship. The results also can be interpreted sepa-
rately by demand condition. After priming a demand-
ing relationship, action-oriented participants thus had
a greater intention memory effect than state-oriented
participants, whereas the reverse was true after priming
an accepting relationship.
Notably, intention superiority effects between action-
and state-oriented participants did not differ during the
practice task. Because demand was not yet manipulated
before the practice task, this lack of an effect suggests
that action- versus state-oriented individuals do not dif-
fer in intention memory under neutral conditions.
Moreover, a covariance analysis revealed that that the
effects of demand on intention memory were indepen-
dent from individual differences in intention memory
under neutral conditions. Of course, such interpreta-
tions should be made with caution given the inherent
difficulties in drawing conclusions from null findings.
Our manipulation checks found that state-oriented
participants perceived the visualized person in both
conditions as somewhat more demanding compared to
action-oriented participants. Even though this effect
was not anticipated, it could not explain the observed
effects of action versus state orientation on intention
memory. First, effects of action versus state orientation
TABLE 2: Average Response Latencies (ms) for Prospective and Neutral Words and Intention Superiority Effect as a Function of Visualization
and Orientation (Study 2)
Visualization
Accepting Demanding
Word Type Word Type
Orientation Prospective Neutral ISE Prospective Neutral ISE
Action 1,401 (387) 1,329 (570) –71 (487)a 1,136 (302) 1,257 (406) 121 (236)b
State 1,241 (347) 1,346 (418) 105 (399)c 1,314 (399) 1,266 (288) –47 (348)d
NOTE: ISE = Intention Superiority Effect (Neutral–Prospective). Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
a. n = 26.
b. n = 27.
c. n = 34.
d. n = 31.
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on intention memory were moderated by situational
demands, and no such moderation effect was obtained
on the manipulation check. Second, when we included
the manipulation check as a covariate, the Orientation ×
Visualization interaction on intention memory remained
significant.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Past research and theorizing have described inconsis-
tent effects of demands on working memory capacity. On
one hand, research has found that working memory is
prone to “choking under pressure” (Baumeister, 1984)
in that people utilize their working memory capacity less
efficiently in demanding situations. On the other hand,
recent notions on top-down control processes suggest
that high demands may serve as a mobilization signal to
utilize working memory capacity more efficiently (c.f.,
Botvinick et al., 2001). The present research suggests
that these apparent inconsistencies can be resolved by
considering the role of action versus state orientation as
a moderator of the effects of situational demands. The
choking pattern is more characteristic of state-oriented
individuals, who utilize their working memory capacity
less efficiently with increasing demands. The mobiliza-
tion pattern, on the other hand, is more characteristic of
action-oriented individuals, who better utilize their work-
ing memory capacity with increasing demands.
In two studies, action-oriented participants utilized
their working memory capacity more efficiently after
visualizing a demanding relationship compared to an
accepting relationship. State-oriented participants dis-
played the opposite pattern: They had less working
memory capacity available after visualizing a demand-
ing relationship compared to an accepting relation-
ship. Stated differently, action-oriented participants
better utilized their working memory capacity than did
state-oriented participants after visualizing a demand-
ing relationship, whereas the reverse was true after visu-
alizing an accepting relationship. These effects were
robust across two very different measures of working
memory capacity, that is, OSPAN (Study 1) and inten-
tion memory (Study 2). Taken together, the present
research highlights the importance of action versus
state orientation in the use of working memory capac-
ity under varying levels of situational demand.
Why would working memory choke under high
demands among state-oriented individuals? Presumably,
state-oriented individuals’ tendency toward indecisive-
ness and hesitation (Kuhl, 1984) renders them less capa-
ble of updating their working memory. Consequently,
state-oriented individuals will be unable to terminate 
the sustained working memory load that is induced by
high-demanding conditions. This, in turn, leaves less
working memory capacity available for subsequent tasks.
Under low-demanding conditions, working memory is
less loaded than under high-demanding conditions.
Consequently, it is less relevant to update working
memory under low-demanding conditions. Moreover,
low-demanding conditions can even help state-oriented
individuals to update their working memory, particularly
when conditions are rewarding. Visualizing an accepting
relationship likely provided such rewarding context,
thereby making more working memory capacity available
for state-oriented individuals to use in subsequent tasks.
Unlike their state-oriented counterparts, action-
oriented participants better utilized their working
memory capacity under high- compared to low-demanding
conditions. A likely explanation for this pattern is that
action-oriented individuals have a tendency toward deci-
siveness and initiative (Kuhl, 1984), which renders them
more capable of updating the contents of their working
memory. Under high demands, action-oriented individu-
als are more inclined to update working memory, thereby
making more working memory capacity available for sub-
sequent tasks. By contrast, low-demanding conditions do
not trigger compensatory updating of working memory
among action-oriented individuals and thus do not lead
to more efficient use of working memory capacity.
Moreover, action-oriented individuals are less receptive to
rewarding contexts than are state-oriented individuals
(Koole et al., 2005). Consequently, visualizing an accept-
ing person does not necessarily facilitate working
memory among action-oriented individuals.
Action-oriented individuals thus utilize their work-
ing memory capacity most efficiently under demanding
conditions, whereas state-oriented individuals utilize
their working memory capacity most efficiently under
rewarding or accepting conditions. This overall pattern
suggests that having an action orientation is more com-
patible with a demanding context, whereas having a
state orientation is more compatible with a rewarding
or accepting context. Despite the observed advantage
of state-oriented individuals under rewarding condi-
tions, however, it is important to note that rewarding or
accepting conditions often may be lacking in common
situations such as at work or during one’s study (cf.
Diefendorff et al., 1998). Accordingly, action orienta-
tion may prove more advantageous than state orienta-
tion in many achievement contexts.
The present research further highlights the role of
relationship schemas for the regulation of basic cognitive
processes. Previous work has shown that priming rela-
tionship schemas activates correspondent goal repre-
sentations and expectations (e.g., Fitzsimons & Bargh,
2003; cf. Chen et al., 2006). The present findings add to
this literature that relationship schemas even influence
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 29, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1726 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
the efficiency of basic memory functions such as working
memory capacity. The present research thus reveals an
important connection between interpersonal and intrap-
ersonal processes (cf. Vohs & Finkel, 2006).
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
The present research has several limitations and thus
leaves important issues open for further investigation.
First, unlike previous research (e.g., Van der Linden et al.,
2003), we did not find main effects of demands on mea-
sures of working memory capacity. Previous research did
not include measures of action versus state orientation. It
is thus possible that previous research has unwittingly
relied on either predominately state-oriented or pre-
dominately action-oriented samples. It is equally con-
ceivable that previous manipulations have induced much
different levels of demand than the present visualization
manipulation. For instance, Van der Linden and col-
leagues (2003) had participants engage in a demanding
task for 2 hours. It seems likely that even action-oriented
individuals use their working memory capacity less effi-
ciently under such extreme demands.
Another important issue concerns the regulation of
working memory capacity under threatening condi-
tions. Previous research has found that people utilize
their working memory capacity less efficiently as a
result of stereotype threat (Schmader & Johns, 2003)
and math anxiety (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). However,
theoretical considerations suggest that people may be
able to convert feelings of threat into feelings of chal-
lenge under conditions that potentially jeopardize their
self-image or well-being (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000).
Based on PSI theory (Kuhl, 2001), we suggest that
action versus state orientation on the threat-related
dimension (AOT) may be an important moderator of
working memory capacity under threat. Specifically,
threat-related action orientation may lead to the mobi-
lization of working memory capacity under conditions
of stereotype threat or math anxiety, whereas threat-
related state orientation may lead to choking under
pressure. Future research may explore this intriguing
possibility.
Concluding Remarks
Working memory is a vital psychological function that
allows people to remember important information even
when they are temporarily distracted. Past research and
theorizing has made inconsistent predictions whether
working memory capacity is utilized more efficiently or less
efficiently under high situational demands. In the present
research, we have suggested that these conflicting notions
can be reconciled by considering the role of action versus
state orientation. In particular, action-oriented individuals
used their working memory capacity most efficiently under
high-demanding conditions, whereas state-oriented indi-
viduals used their working memory capacity most effi-
ciently under low-demanding conditions. The present
research thus illuminates how different individuals dynam-
ically regulate the waxing and waning of working memory.
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1. A correlational analysis (Koole, 2005) on undergraduates’
responses (N = 67) on the Action Control Scale (ASC-90; Kuhl, 1994)
and the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001)
revealed that the demand-related subscale of the ASC-90 (AOD) cor-
relates moderately with both promotion (r = .42, p < .001) and pre-
vention focus (r = .35, p < .003).
2. The labels “demand-related” and “threat-related” action orien-
tation were suggested by Koole and Jostmann (2004) as alternatives
for the original “decision-related” and “failure-related” action orien-
tation, respectively (Kuhl, 1994). The new denotations fit better with
relevant constructs within personality systems interactions (PSI)
theory (Kuhl, 2001).
3. In the present research, we split our samples at the conceptual
midpoint of the AOD scale, which corresponds to the normative mid-
point based on a large-scale study among Dutch university students
(N = 1,457; Koole, 2003). We further examined our data in Studies 1
and 2 using a regression approach. In Study 1, the Orientation ×
Visualization interaction on Operation Span (OSPAN) was signifi-
cant, β = .271, t(73) = 2.35, p < .03, R2 = .08. In Study 2, the
Orientation × Visualization interaction on the intention superiority
effect also was significant, β = .237, t(117) = 2.60, p < .02, R2 = .06.
Thus, a regression approach yielded results equivalent to an ANOVA
approach. Because a regression approach made it difficult to inspect
the absolute means of the dependent variables, we report the ANOVA
results in the main body of this article.
4. A′ was calculated according to the following formulas: (a) if H >
FA, A′ = .5 + (H – FA) (1 + H – FA)/4H(1 – FA), (b) if H = FA, A′ = .5,
and (c) if H < FA, A′ = .5 – (FA – H) (1 + FA – H)/4FA(1 – H), where 
H is the hit rate and FA is the false alarm rate.REFERENCES
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